In four experiments with 4-, 6-, and 9-year-old children and adults, the hypothesis was tested that, all other conditions being equal, anovel and unusual event elicits stronger curiosity and exploratorybehaviour if its suggested explanation involves an element of the supernatural than if it does not (the impossible over possible effect -the I/P effect). Participants weres hown an unusual phenomenon (a spontaneous disintegration of a physical object in an apparently empty box) framed in the context of either am agical (the impossible event) or scientific (the possible event) explanation.
physical laws. In contrast to possible events that are compatible with the fundamental laws of nature (such as object permanence or physical causality),a ni mpossible event is incompatible with these laws. Ghosts, witchcraft, astrology,m agic, and other impossible phenomena have always attracted considerable public interest (Jahoda, 1969; Lundahl, 1993; Zusne&J ones, 1982) . What remain unclear,h owever,a re the causes of this attraction. Indeed, due to their very nature, the above phenomena are rarely observed and there is no hard evidencet hat theya re actually real; hence, they are extremely novel. Apartf rom being novel, theya re also impossible (i.e., cannotb e explained in terms of modern science).A long with impossible events, in contemporaryi ndustrial societies theree xist an umbero fo bjectsa nd events (such as the products of technology or medicine) that are equally novel and counter-intuitive (i.e., beyond the individual'sc apacity to understand), yett heya re considered explainable and provide the individual with little inspiration to explore. The question arises of whether impossible phenomena elicit interest and exploration simply because theya re novel or because theya re also impossible, i.e., theyi nvolvea ne lement of the supernatural.
To examinet his, it is necessaryt op rovide ap articipant with an ovel counterintuitive stimulus that is framed eitheri nt he context of natural (physical) causality (a counter-intuitivep ossible event) or in ac ontextt hat involves an element of the supernatural (ani mpossible event). If the stimulus' impossibility is an additional factort hat contributes towards eliciting curiosity and exploration, then participants' tendency to engagei ne xploratoryb ehaviour towards the impossible event should be stronger than towards the same but possible event. If this indeed is the case, then it can be named the 'impossible over possible' (I/P) effect.C onsequently,i nt his paper the I/P effect implies that, other conditions being equal, an ovel and counterintuitive event elicitss tronger curiositya nd exploratoryb ehaviour in participants if its suggested explanation includes an element of the supernatural than if it does not.
With some reservations,t he beginningo ft he investigation of the I/P effect can be traced to studies of infancy.Ithas been shown, forinstance, that young infants showa higher degree of exploratory behaviour towards displays that violate principles of physical causality than towardss imilar displays with no violation of these principles (Baillargeon, 1987; Leslie, 1982 Leslie, , 1984 . Thesed ata suggest that infants possess sensitivitytowards violation of intuitive natural causal order.The question that remains open is whether the same is the case forr eflective ideas about physical causality in children and adults. Sperber (1997) contrasted reflective beliefs that are primarily of cultural origins and intuitive beliefs that are the direct output of perceptual and spontaneous inferential processes. There is no doubt that the way older children and adults perceivet he distinction between possible and impossible events is different from the way that infants perceivet his distinction. Unlike infants, older children and adults possess reflective knowledge of what is possible and impossible in the physical world. The possession of language and scientific educationc reate in children and adults the clear and conscious understanding that physical laws (sucha so bject permanence or physical causality) arei nviolate.T hisu nderstanding canb e symbolically represented andv erballyf ormulated in scientific terms.A sa consequence of this, one can assume that in moderni ndustrial societies older children and adults tend to viewa ny observable eventa sapossible event (i.e., as one that complies with the laws of physics). Even if ac ertain physical effect looks counter-intuitive( i.e., like av iolation of the fundamental laws of nature),i ti ss till viewed as ap ossible effect, the causes of which are hidden from direct observation (i.e., as am agict rick).
If this assumption was true, then ademonstration of acertain novel counter-intuitive effect would elicit the same degree of curiosity and exploratoryb ehaviour in the participants regardless of its framing in as cientific or non-scientific (i.e., magical) reflective context. Alternatively, it can be assumed that, in the modernw orld, older children and even adults still hold some belief in the reality of effects that violate fundamentallawsofnature. Indeed, in manyways reflective ideas about magicand the supernatural are widely cultivated in modernl ife, in children'sp lay and literature, in fiction,religion, and other alternative belief systems (Luhrman, 1989; Nemeroff&Rozin, 2000; Tambiah, 1990; Vyse, 1997) . It is possible therefore, that modernh uman individuals are still attractedtothe idea of supernatural forces. While explicitly denying that such events can happeni nr eall ife, implicitly people might still believe that impossible events can occur.I nt his case, individuals' curiosity towards( and their interest in exploring) such events will be stronger than towards the counter-intuitive but possible events (the I/P effect).
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In this study,a ni mpossible event, which was contrasted with ac ounter-intuitive possible event, was an instanceo f' true magic'. Independently of whether true magice xists or does not exist in the real world, it certainly exists in the area of imagination and,t herefore, merits ac lear definition. One can distinguish at least four classeso fe ventst hat are usually viewed as truly magical: 'mind over matter'( moving or changingp hysical objects by sheer effort of will or thought), 'spontaneous coming to life' (a sudden acquisition of feelings or independent movements by an inanimate object), 'non permanence magic' (a physical object spontaneously changes its shape,a ppearsf rom thin air or disappearsw ithoutat race), and 'participation or sympathetic magic' (the widespreadb elief that certain chosen objectsa nd actions can bring luck or affect the flow of natural events) (see Boyer,1 994; Frazer,1 923; Jahoda, 1969; Needham,1 976; Tambiah, 1990) . Despite the diversity of these types of events, noneo ft hem are compatible with the views of modernp hysics. If a person can clearly distinguish between magical events (like ap iece of paper changingi ts shape as ar esult of am agic spell) and ordinary events (the piece of paper is changed as ar esult of at rick), then the person can be said to have an adequate concepto ft he difference between impossible (truly magical) and possible (physical) events.
In recent decades, the study of magical thinking and magical beliefs has been on the rise. Harris, Brown, Marriott, Whittall, and Harmer (1991) showed that preschool children endow fairytale characters(like monstersorwitches) with special capacities, and theyare fearful of monstersdespite the knowledgethat theydonot exist. Johnson and Harris( 1994) demonstrated that 3-to 5-year-old children viewed magical transformations of objectst ob ei mpossible, yeti nt heir actions theys howed considerable credulity towardsm agic. Other studies showed the ability of preschool children to distinguish magical transformationsf rom non-magical ones and make effectiveu se of the concepto fm agic ( Rosengren &H ickling, 1994; S ubbotsky,1 985) . Chandler and Lalonde (1994) showed to preschoolersa ged3 -5 yearsa ne ffect that appeared to be one solid object passing unhindered through aspace already occupied by another solid object.A lthough about7 0% of childreni nitially labelled the event 'magical', on exploring the apparatus the children discovered the trap door mechanism and came to judgethe effect theyhad seen to be 'a trick'. In anotherexperiment of this study 9-to 13-year-olds were exposed to aseries of demonstrations that challengedtheir belief in the laws of conservation. Thesedemonstrations were administeredeither by a magician, apsychologist, or a'priest'. When retested in about10days later,the majority of childreninthe magician conditionrecovered their earlier commitments to the laws of conservation, whereas most children in the other two conditions kept giving nonconservationresponses.
Even adults show at endency to follow the ruleso fc ontagiousa nd sympathetic magici nm aking their emotional preferences (Rozin, Markwith, &R oss, 1990; Rozin, Millman, &N emeroff, 1986) and are able to quite consciouslya ct in aw ay that is concordant with ab elief in magic ( Subbotsky,1 997, 2001 ,2 005).W oolley ( 1997) concluded that with regardt ot heir engagement in magical thinking, adults are not fundamentallyd ifferentfrom children.
While considerable progress in studying magical beliefs has been made,a nother aspecto fm agical thinking -c hildren'sa nd adults'c uriosity towardsm agic -r emains largely unexplored.I tm ust be emphasized that curiosity towards magicd oes not necessarily involvea ne xplicitb elief in magic and vicev ersa. Indeed, ap erson can believe in magic and yet be afraid of it and reluctant to explore this belief. Conversely, ap erson may treat the possibility of magic with skepticism and yet be curious towards magic and willingt oe xplore whether magicc an be ar eal thing. At the same time, it is also possible that individuals whoe xpress curiosity towards magicm ight actually hold some belief in magic. To test fort he existence of the I/P effect,inExpt1 children 4, 6a nd 9y ears of agew erei ndividually tested in two conditions in which theyw ere given ac hoice aboutw hether or not to place their valuable objects at risk in order to see an unusual phenomenon (a disappearance of an ew postages tamp in an apparently emptyb ox). In the 'impossible condition' (IC),t he phenomenon was suggested to have been caused by magic, and in the 'counter-intuitive possible condition' (CIPC) by at rick box. Care was taken that in bothc onditions on exploring the trick box participants were not able to discover the trap door.T his guaranteed that, unlike in Chandler and Lalonde's(1994) experiment, in this experiment in the IC participants would be less likely to treat the effects as tricks and more likely to treat them as instances of true magict hat involves an element of the supernatural (i.e., av iolation of object permanence). It was predicted that if children'se xploratory behaviour were triggered by the novelty of the unusual phenomenon, then the numberso fp articipants encouraging the experimenter to reproduce the phenomenon would be approximately the samei nb oth conditions. If,h owever,i n additiont ot he event'sn ovelty,m agich ad an intrinsicm otivational value forc hildren, then the number of children willing to put their valuable objectsa tr isk in the IC would be significantly larger than in the CIPC.I nE xpt 2, the samem ethodology was employed with adult participants. Expt3aimed to examinei ft he I/P effect can be explained by the slight methodological differences between conditions, in particular,b yt he causality vector (external in the IC and internal in the CIPC). Finally, in Expt4 ,t he possibility was explored that participants viewed the effect produced by am agics pella st he worko fahigh-tech device and not as av iolation of fundamentalp hysical principles.
EXPERIMENT 1 Method

Participants
In total, 84 childrenwho passed the pre-test interview 2 participated in 2conditions of this experiment. In each condition,there were 42 children aged 4, 6, and 9years, 14 in each agecategory, with equalnumbersofboys and girls. For the IC, mean ages and age ranges were as follows( years,m onths): M ¼ 4 : 5, 4.1 to 4.11; M ¼ 6 : 6, 6.2 to 6.11; M ¼ 9 : 9, 9.3 to 9.11.For the CIPC theywere: M ¼ 4 : 6, 4.2 to 4.11; M ¼ 6 : 7, 6.2 to 6.10; M ¼ 9 : 8, 9.1 to 9.11. The participants were taken from schools in Thessaloniki and Stavros,Greece.
Materials
Awooden 'trick box', two postagestamps, and a'magic wand' wereused. The box was constructedi ns uch aw ay that am etal plate became detached from one of the inside walls and sank to the bottom as soon as the lid wasclosed. Asystem of magnetsbuilt into the side and the bottom of the box ensured that the box could be manipulated by the participants without the trap door being discovered.
Design
Condition (IC vs. CIPC) and age(4, 6, and 9years)werebetween-subjects independent variables.The number of childrenwho wanted to explore the effect using their valuable objectswas the dependent variable.
Procedure
Pre-testinterview
The aim of the interview was to ensure that children were capable of distinguishing between magical and ordinaryt ransformations. Theyw ere individuallya sked the following questions:
( Only children who answered all four questions correctly were allowed to proceedtothe main interview.
Main interview
This included two trials: the demonstration trial and the action trial, which followed the demonstrationtrial.
Demonstration trial
In the IC, children were individuallyshown a'magic box' and apostagestamp. Next, the child was given aw ooden stick and told that it was am agic wand and that he or she could check whether it worked. The child was thene ncouragedt op lace the postage stamp into the box, close the box, and wave the magic wand in order to makethe stamp disappear.
After the children did this,theywere asked if theythought that the stamp was still in the box or had disappeared. Whatever the answer,the child was encouragedtoopen the box. On opening the box, children found that it was empty.
In the CIPC, the procedure wassimilar,but no magic wand wasgiven to the child. Children weree ncouragedt op lace the postages tamp in the box and close the box and were then asked whether theyb elieved that the stamp wass till there or had disappeared. Next, the children werea sked to open the box and discovered that it was empty.
In bothconditions, children werethankedfor their answersand given an attractive postages tamp as praise.
Action trial
In the IC, the childrenw ere askedi ft heyw anted to put their 'praise' postages tamps into the box in order to see again how the magicwand works.
In the CIPC,t he instructionw as the same, except that the last words were ' ::: in order to see again how the box works'.
Hypothesis
It was expected that if children were moreinterested in experimenting with magic than in experimenting with the trick box, then the number of children who would encourage the experimenter to reproduce the magical action in the IC would be significantly larger than the number of children whowished to place their praise postagestamps into the box in the CIPC.I ft he prediction proved correct,t his would provide evidence for the I/P effect. Thisf ollows from the fact that, apart from using the magic wand, the phenomenon to be seen (the disappearanceo fapostages tamp in an empty box) and the risks to be taken (losing the praisepostage stamp) wereidentical in both conditions.
Results
In the IC, all children showed surprise in the demonstration trial, and abouth alf of the children made critical commentaries ('This is not amagicwand', 'You cannot be a magician'). In the action trial, most childrenwished to repeat the experience and used the magic wand on their praise stamps in the box.
In the CIPC,all children were surprised to see the stampdisappear,but only afew of them wanted to repeat the effect using their praiseo bjects.
The percentages of children in the three agegroups whoagreed to proceed with the testing using their praiseobjectsineach testing conditionare shown in Table 1 . In the IC, the proportions of children whoa greed to the testing on their valuable objects significantly exceeded those in the CIPC, with Fisher'se xact probabilities being p ¼ : 0007, p ¼ : 009, and p ¼ : 0002 for4-, 6-, and 9-year-olds, respectively.
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There were no significant aged ifferences within conditions.
Discussion
The results supportt he hypothesis that children would show as ignificantlys tronger tendency to experiment with the magicwand than with the trick box, thus revealing the I/P effect. In all agegroups, asignificantlylarger number of children wanted to put their praise objectsatrisk in the IC than in the CIPC.
An alternative explanation of this difference might be the greater amount of risk taken in the CIPC, because it is easier to believe that at ricky box can destroyo bjects (CIPC) than that amagicwand can do this (IC). Indeed, in the demonstration trial of the IC, childrenm ay have thought that the postages tamp disappeared because the box made this happen while viewing the magic wand manipulation as adistracter.However, if in the IC the children viewed the box as ar eal cause of the postage stamp's disappearance, then in the action trial, theyw ould be reluctant to place their praise postagestamps in the box in the IC to the same extent as in the CIPC. However,this was not the case.
There remain, however,other possibilities foralternative explanations of the above result. The first alternative explanation is that, even though in the pre-test interview all children called the impossible event magical, it was not completely clear if magicmeant true magic (which involves the element of the supernatural)o rs tagem agic( tricks). As wass hown in earlier studies,c hildren of preschool and school ages often label as Ta ble 1. Percentages of children(out of 14 total) who agreed to proceed with the testing using their valuable objects, as af unction of age (4, magical the events forw hich theys implyh ave no plausible scientific explanations (Chandler &Lalonde,1994; Phelps &W oolley, 1994; Rosengren &Hickling, 1994) . If, in the pre-test interview in Expt 1, children, while correctly telling magical effectsf rom non-magical ones, viewed magical effects as magic tricks, then the statistical difference between conditions would result from the fact that children found the magictrick in the IC to be more interesting than the magic trick theyobservedi nthe CIPC. The second alternative explanation comes from the possibility that in Expt1the children were not aware of the irreversibility of the postages tamp'sd isappearance. Theym ay have been more willingt oe xperiment with the magicw and (IC)t han with the trick box (CIPC) on at acit assumptiont hat theyw ould be able to subsequently recover the stamp with the samem agicw and -apossibility that would be much less likely forabox that annihilates objectsplaced into it.
The third alternative explanation is that in the IC the observed effect was made to look as if it had been caused by an external factor (by waving the magic wand),whereas in the CIPC it was made to look as though it were happening inside the box. Also, own agencycould play arole in the effect: the child did something to create an effect in the IC conditiont here, but not in the CIPC condition. Thisd ifference in the 'causality vector' (external vs. internal) and agency (doing vs. not doing something) could also contribute to the fact that childreninthe IC were willingtorepeat the experiment with their praise objectsmoref requently than in the CIPC.
Finally, in Expt1cultural background may have influenced children'sa nswers. In Greece, magical beliefsa re widely spreada mong the population. Fore xample, a surveyb yt he Commissiono ft he European Communities (1993) askedp eople to indicate what disciplines (such as biology,p hysics, astronomy,m edicine, and others) theyfi nd scientific or not scientific. Interestingly,3 0-40% of the respondents gave astrology the highest mark on the 'science'end of the scale, viewing it no less 'scientific' than physics or astronomy (Gorney, 2006) .Onthis ground, in subsequent experiments of this study it wasnecessary to employ participants from othercultural backgrounds.
To examinet he first and second alternative explanations, in Expt 2m ainly British adult participants were tested in the same two conditions. In contrast to children, the difference between true magic that involves an element of the supernatural and stage magic(atrick) that does not can be more clearly explained to adults. It can also be made clear to them that losing their valuable objectsineither of the test conditionswould be irreversible. In terms of culture,British participants scoredlow on their verbalmagical beliefs (Subbotsky,2 000; S ubbotsky &Q uinteros, 2002) , thus explicitb eliefs in magic could not interfere with these participants' curiosity and exploratoryb ehaviour. Participants were32university undergraduate and graduate students,16ineach of the 2conditions. Mean ages and ageranges forthe IC and CIPC were M ¼ 21: 7, 18-42and M ¼ 21, 18-33, respectively. Theywere primarilyBritish and Caucasian. Approximately, 30% of the participants werei nternational visiting undergraduates from continental Europe, Asia, and the USA. About half of participants were psychology students,and the other half represented disciplines other than psychology.
Materials
Materials wereamagic box, the sameasinExpt 1, two identical postagestamps (one of them new,another cut in half),and participants'driving licenses.
Design
Test condition was ab etween-subjects variable with two levels (IC vs. CIPC). The number of participants whowanted to test the effect on their driving licenses was the dependent variable.
Procedure
The procedure of this experiment followed the procedure of Expt 1, with af ew exceptions.F irst, in the demonstration trial, instead of the magic wand, am agics pell pronounced by an experimenter was used as am agical setup fort he phenomenon. This was done in ordert oe quate the 'own agency' factor: in both conditions, all that participants were required to do is to place their driving licenses into the box. Second, in order to prevent ad irect association between the magical effectsp resented in the pre-test interview and the main interview,t he objectse mployed in the pre-test interview were changed: instead of the box and the postages tamp, ab riefcase and a book were used. Third, with the aim of ensuring that the participants could distinguish between true magica nd stagem agic, the differences between these two possibilities weree xplicitly spelled out in the questions with the impossible outcome (questions 2a nd 4). For instance, in question 2, after the unexpected appearance of the book in the briefcase was described, the experimenter continued as follows: 'Now, consider two possibilities. Possibility 1: The book appeared in the briefcase because my magics pellm ade it appear from nothing; Is imply thought hard aboutm aking the book appear,s aid my magics pell, and the book appeared from thin air.P ossibility 2: There was some trap compartment in the briefcase, and the book appeared from that compartment.W hich of these two possibilities is at rick, and which is an instance of true magic?'
In the demonstration trial of the IC, afterp articipants were asked to put an ew postages tampi nt he box and close the lid, the experimenter informed them that he wasg oing to put am agics pell on the box to destroyt he stamp. The experimenter thenp ronounced as eries of words that sounded like am agics pell. Next, participants were encouragedt oo pen the box and discovered that the postages tamp was cut in half.
Participants weret hen encouragedt oi nspect the box and asked to explaint he phenomenon. Next, the experimenter asked whether participants believed that the experimenter was in command of magicp owersa nd that he destroyedt he postage stamp by puttingamagicspellont he box.
In the action trial,ifthe answer to the previousquestion was'yes', the instruction was as follows: 'OK. Do you think it is wortht ryingt ot est my magic spell on your driving license right now,o rd oy ou think it is notwortht rying?' If the answer to the suggested magical explanation was 'no', the instruction was different. Indeed, if participants explicitly acknowledget hat theya re non-believers in magic, theymight feel uncomfortable not encouraging the experimenter to proceed with the magics pell, fori tw ould show that theya ctually believe in magic. As a result, the participants might be willingtoreassure the experimenter in order to show that theya re skeptical and encouraget he experimenter to proceed with the testing. In order to minimize this possibility,t he experimenter explicitly stressed that he was aware of the participants' skepticism towards magic and would not interpret their desire to repeat the experiment with their driving licenses as ac oncession to magical beliefs. The instructiont herefore was as follows: 'I see now that youd on't believe in magic, so youdon't think that if Ireproduced this magicspellonyour driving license it would destroy your license, do you?' Next, the experimenter asked the subjectifitwas still wortht ryingthe magicspellont he participant'sdriving license. The aim of these questions was to find out whethert he participants, though skepticalt owards magic, would nevertheless be curious to tryi ta gain by puttingtheir valuable object at risk.
In addition, the question about the possibility of further experimenting with magic was asked in an eutral way (Do you think it is wortht rying :::)i no rder to avoid any tacit suggestion that the experimenter was interested in trying the magics pello nt he participants'licenses. As aresult, participants wereassured that theywerenot viewed as believersinmagicand that the experimenterhimself had no specific interest in the continuation of the experiment. Under these circumstances, the only motive that could encourage participants to promptthe experimenter to proceed with the experiment is their curiosity to findout whether the magic would workagain,evenifthis time there might be aprice to pay.
In the demonstration trial of the CIPC,p articipants weres imply shown the phenomenon of ap ostage stampb eing cut in half in the box. In the actiont rial of the CIPC,t he participants were asked: 'Do you think it is wortht rying to test this hypothesis by closing the box with your driving license inside it, or do you think it is not worthtrying?'
In both conditions, participants who agreed to place their driving licenses into the box and continue the experiment were explicitly warned that the experimenter takes no responsibilityf or their driving licenses's afety and that, if damaged, their licenses could not be restored. In addition, in both conditions participants whoe ncouraged (did not encourage)the experimenter to proceed with testingwere asked why theydid (did not do) so. In this and the following experiments,p articipants'j ustifications in favour of testing were coded in two categories: 'curiosity' ('BecauseIa mc urious towards magic', 'If anything like that happened to my license, I'll show it to my kids', 'Even if Idon'tbelieve in magic, Iamstill open minded', 'It would be exciting if you did it', 'I was interested to see if youcould do it, Ibelieve in magic not in the fairytale sense, but as ap ower of mind', 'Because if youc ould do something like this,t hen my skepticism aboutthe power of spirituality would be significantly reduced', 'I wanted to see whether it would workwith my license')and 'skepticism' ('BecauseIdid not believe it could work, Iw anted to prove that it did not work'). Participants' answers against testing were also coded in two categories: 'skepticism' (as above) and 'concernf or safety' ('Thisissome kind of power,bad power.Y ou are not doingthis forany good', 'I think it is not agoodidea ::: which means Ihave to believe in it to some extent','Only if you could thenrestore it backtoits original state'). In the IC, theywere also askedif theyw ould be happyi ft he magic really worked. Participants'a nswersw ere coded as positive (e.g., 'Yes, I'dlike to believe in magic,the world seems to be too boring, every question seems to have answers, I'dl ike if it had some mysteryi ni t', 'I'db eh appy, because you can meet people with powers, and youcan getthis power of your own if you believe in it', 'I am aphysics student, Iamtrying not to believe it, but there is still something in the back of my mind that makes me curious that it might work', 'Yes, it would be nice to have something that can't be explained', 'If you'dbeable to prove that magicworks, it would changemyperspective and perception of the world') or neutral ('I really don't care') 5 .
Hypothesis
The hypothesis in this experiment wast he same as in Expt1:i tw as assumed that if it was aspecific interest in seeing the impossible event (and not just an amazing trick) that made the participants explore, then the number of 'curious' participants in the IC would be significantly larger than in the CIPC (theI/P effect).
Results
In the pre-test interview, all of the participants showed ac lear understanding of the difference between instances of true magical events and tricks that looked like magical events. Only the possibility in which amagicspell produced or destroyed the book by itself wasa cknowledgedt ob et ruem agic.
In the demonstrationtrial, all participants examinedthe box with obvious curiosity. In the IC, two participants agreed that the postagestamp might have been cut with the magicspell. Othersthought it wassome kind of trick produced by the box. In the CIPC, all participants thought that the effect wasatrick.
In the action trial, all participants in the IC encouraged the experimenter to trythe magics pell on their licenses.I nt he CIPC,n ine participants decided that it was worth trying the tricky box on their driving licenses, and seven participants said that it was not. The difference between conditions was significant, Fisher'se xact p ¼ : 003.
The analysis of participants'a nswerst ot he follow-up question about why they encouragedt he experimenter to proceed with the magics pelly ielded the following results.Inthe IC, 15 participants justified this by curiosity,and 1gave askeptically based justification.
To the follow-up question of whether theyw ould be happyorn ot to discover that magicw as real, all but one participant answered positively. In the CIPC,o ut of nine participants who encouragedt he experimenter to proceed with testing, four justified this by their curiosity to see how the tricky box would work, and five said theyd id it because theyd id not believe anything would happen to their driving licenses. All participants whor efusedt op roceedw ith testing justified this by concerna bout their licenses'safety.
Discussion
The results of Expt 2c onfirmed the I/P effect:a dult participants showed as ignificant preference fore xperimentingwith amagicspellover experimenting with at rick box. This happened even though the majority of participants came from the cultural background weree xplicitm agical beliefs are rare, had ac lear understanding that the effect theywanted to see was true magic and not atrick and that if their driving licenses were indeed damaged, this would be irreversible. This result makes the first and second alternative explanations of the result of Expt1unlikely.
Participants'a nswerst ot he follow-up questions showed that their reason for encouraging the experimenter to proceed with the magic spellw as not to show their skepticism towardsm agic, but rather to satisfy their curiosity towards the possibility that it might still work. The presence of the specific motivation of curiosity towards magicwas confirmed by the fact that all but one of the participants said theywould be happyt od iscover that magic wasr eal. Some participants were even more explicito n the topic, saying that if magic were real it would make the world am orei nteresting place to live.
In contrast,i nt he CIPC only 9o f1 6p articipants encouraged the experimenter to proceed with the testing, and only 4ofthose justified their decisions by curiosity.Asthe unusual phenomenon demonstrated (cutting ap ostages tamp inside the box) was the same in bothc onditions and the only difference between the conditions wast he presence or absence of the magical context, this result clearly provides evidence of the I/P effect.
There remains,h owever,t he third alternative explanation of the participants' stronger desire to repeat the effect theyo bservedi nt he IC than in the CIPC:t he 'causality vector' (external in the IC vs. internal in the CIPC)e xplanation. In order to examine this explanation, in Expt3the causality vector was made external in both conditions.
Another hypothesis tested in Expt3was that increasing the irreversibility of the magical effect in the demonstration trial would decrease the number of participants willingt oe xperiment with magic by using their valuable objects. Thish ypothesis is based on the assumption that, in the participants' view,making the magical effect more irreversible increases the probability of their valuable objectsb eing damaged in the action trial and thus raises the cost of exploratoryb ehaviour.
EXPERIMENT 3
Participants In total, 34 undergraduate and graduate students,m ales and females, were involved in this experiment, 18 in the IC ( M ¼ 20: 4, 18-22) and 16 in the CIPC ( M ¼ 21: 4, 19-32) . Theywereprimarily British and Caucasian.Approximately,25% of the participants were internationalvisiting undergraduates from continentalEurope, Asia, and the USA. About half of participants were psychology students,and the other half represented disciplines other than psychology.
Materials
Materials were amagicbox, the sameasinExpt1,two identical postagestamps with a picture of an insect'shead(one of them new,another half burned), participants'driving licenses,a nd an ovel physical device that produced light and sound effects when switched on.
Design
The design wast he same as in Expt 2.
Procedure
The procedure was the same as in Expt2 ,s avet hree differences. First, in the demonstrationtrial the phenomenon shown was burning half of the stamp, not cutting it in half as in Expt 2. This was done in order to maket he 'magical effect'l ook more irreversible. Indeed, if the driving license is cut in half, one might tape it back together, but this would be impossible to do with the license half burnt. Second, in the CIPC,after aparticipant put the stampinthe box and closed the lid, the experimenter switched the novel physical device on forafewsecondsand then offagain.Thiswas done to acquaint the 'causality vector' factorinboth conditions by making the causes of the unexplained phenomenal ookl ike external events (either the magics pell or the physical device). As in the IC, in the CIPC,a fter the demonstrationo ft he effect, participants were asked if theyt hought that the physical device had burned the postage stamp. Third, at the end of the experiment the third (imaginative) trial was introduced. In this trial, participants were asked if theywould be prepared to proceedwith the testing if it were not their driving licenses but their more valuable documents -p assportsinvolved in the experiment. The purpose of this trial was to examine if the I/P effect would remain under the condition in which the costo fe xploratoryb ehaviour was furtheri ncreased.
Hypotheses
If the alternative explanation of the results of Expts 1a nd 2b yd ifferences in the causality vectors between conditions (external in the IC vs. internal in the CIPC) were true, then in this experiment the numbers of participants willingt oe xperiment with their driving licenses in the IC and the CIPC would be approximately the same. If, however,the number of participants who wished to put their valuable objectsatrisk in the IC were significantlyh igher than in the CIPC,t hen this alternative explanation would be overruled.
It was also expected that increasing the irreversibility of the magical effect (burning the stamp instead of cutting it in half) would significantlyd ecreaset he number of participants who wished to experiment with their driving licenses in the IC as compared with the numberi nE xpt 2.
Finally, it was expected that in the imaginaryt rial the I/P effect should disappear. This wasexpected on the grounds that, in addition to increasing the cost of exploratory behaviour via making the magical effect more irreversible in the demonstration trial, in the imaginaryt rial this costw ill be further increased via making the 'objects at risk' more valuable (participants' passports instead of their driving licenses).W ith such a high cost of exploratorybehaviour in the IC, participants' concerns about their valuable objects' safety will overpowertheir curiosity towardsseeing the impossible event, and this will disguisethe difference in curiosity betweenc onditions.
Results
In the pre-test interview, all participants clearly distinguished betweent ruem agica nd stagemagic. In the demonstration trial of the main interview,four participants in the IC agreed that the magic spellproduced the phenomenon, with the rest of the participants saying that it was am agict rick.I nt he CIPC, 14 participants agreed that the physical device produced the effect, and 2p articipants said that the box did it. The difference between the proportions of participants acceptingthe suggested explanations in the IC and CIPC is significant, Fisher'se xact p ¼ : 0002.
Atotal of 12 participants in the IC (67% of the sample) and 4participants in the CIPC (25% of the sample) agreed to proceed with the testing on their driving licenses,w ith the rest saying theywould rather not. This difference between conditions is significant, Fisher'se xact p ¼ : 017.
The reasons that participants provided fort heir desire to experiment with their licenses were as follows. In the IC, 11 participants justified this by their curiosity and interest to explore, and 1said she wanted to prove that this was not magic. Participants who refused to experiment with their licenses justified this by their concernabout their licenses'safety.I nt he CIPC,j ustifications fort he 'yes' answer all referredt oc uriosity, and 'no' answerswere justified by concernabout the licenses'safety.
In the imaginarytrial with the participants'passports, 7participants in the IC and 2 in the CIPC said theyw ould like to experiment with their passports, and the rest said theyw ould not. The difference between conditions is in the samed irectiona s in the case of the driving licenses,y et it failed to reach as ignificant level, Fisher's exact p ¼ : 08.
Acomparison betweenthe results of Expt 2(cutting) and this experiment (burning) (Table 2) shows that in this experiment the proportion of participants who opted to experiment on their licenses decreased significantly fort he IC, Fisher'se xact p ¼ : 02, but insignificantly fort he CIPC,Fisher'se xact p ¼ : 07.
Discussion
The data did not supportt he alternativee xplanation of the results of Expt1by the difference in the causality vectorsbetween conditions. In Expt3,the apparent causes of the phenomenon were external in both conditions (the magics pell in the IC and the physical device in the CIPC). Yet, as in Expts 1and 2, in this experiment asignificantly larger number of participants were willingtoengageinexploratorybehaviour with their driving licenses in the IC than in the CIPC.T hisi ncreases the plausibility of the hypothesis that an impossible event is intrinsicallym ore interesting than an equally novel and unexplained possible event (the I/P effect).
As expected,increasing the irreversibility of the magical effect inhibited exploratory behaviour in the IC, presumably by increasing its potential cost. As in Expt 2, in this experiment in the demonstrationt rial of the IC most participants were skeptical towards the suggestive magical explanation, yett he number of participants who were willingtoe xperiment with their licenses dropped significantly as compared to Expt 2. In the CIPC the effect was in the same direction, however,a st he total numberso f participants willingtoexperiment with their licenses in this condition weresignificantly smaller than in the IC, the effect did not reach as ignificant level. Finally, the expectation that in the imaginaryt rial, the difference betweent he two conditions would drop to an insignificant level with the increased cost of exploratory behaviour (participants'passports) was also supported by the result. Thissuggests that the I/P effect can only be observed under acertain 'optimal' degree of cost, and when the cost becomes toohigh the I/P effect disappears.However,ifthe hypothesis linking the I/P effect with the 'floor and ceiling' of the cost of exploratorybehaviour is valid, theninthe 'low cost' trial, as in the 'high cost trial', the I/P effect should not be observed.
In addition, testing adults instead of children creates the possibility foro ne more -'high-tech' -alternative explanation of the I/P effect.The problem is that most modern adults are familiar with all sorts of sophisticated devices,s uch as the 'clapper' (the sound-wave sensitive light switchthat directly respondstosomeone'sclapping) or cell phones and certain GPS systems( globalp ositioning systems, such as satellite car navigators) that can be programmed to respond to voiced commands. Even though in this experiment the effect of the magicspell was presented as acase of true magic, there is no certaintyastowhether participants did indeedviewthe effect as one that includes an element of the supernatural. Though small, the possibility exists to interpret the magicspellasanauditory signal that triggerssome remote controlled device in the box, burning the object inside. If this is the case, then in this experiment, as in Expt2,the I/P effect can still be explained by the difference in the intrinsicinterest of the two possible events ratherthan by the difference between possible and impossible events. Although this explanation cannotb ec ompletely overruled, its likelihood could be reduced by creating an explicitclash between the 'impossible' (magical) and the high-tech possible (non-magical) explanations.
EXPERIMENT 4 Method
Participants Participants were university undergraduate and graduate students,m ales and females, 18 in the IC ( M ¼ 19: 7, 18 to 22) and 15 in the CIPC ( M ¼ 20: 8, 18 to 33).Theywere primarilyB ritish andC aucasian.A pproximately,3 5% of thep articipants were internationalv isiting undergraduates from continental Europe, Asia, and the USA. About half of participants werep sychology students,a nd the other half represented disciplines other than psychology.
Materials
Materials were the samea si nE xpt 3, save one difference: instead of the participants' driving licenses,the experimenter'sb usinesscard waso nt he table.
Design
Procedure
The procedure was the same as in Expt 3, except forthe following differences. First, in the action trial, instead of the participants'driving licenses, the experimenter'sbusiness card was used. This was done in order to reduce the price of exploratorybehaviour to a minimum and thus further examinet he hypothesis linking the I/P effect with the optimal degree of costofe xploratoryb ehaviour.
Second, after the participants responded to the question of whether theyw ere willingtoproceedwith testing using the businesscard, in the IC the instruction was as follows: 'It is quite clear that what happened to this postage stamp was either ah ightech trick, fore xample av oice-sensor device hidden in the box, or an instanceoft rue magic, do youagree? In the beginning of this experiment you and Iagreed on what true magicwas and what atrick was, didn't we? So, if it was my magic spell that burned part of this stamp, then was it an instance of true magico rahigh-tech trick?'
After the participants gave their answers,the instructioncontinued:'OK. Now,my condition is as follows. If you are 100% sure that it wassome kind of high-tech trick, then there is no point of trying my magic spell on this businessc ard and this experiment ends. However,ifyou allow forthe possibility that it was an instance of true magic, Iwill trym ym agics pello nt his businessc ard. As fara si tc oncerns me, Id on't care if you allow or do not allow fort he possibility that it was an instance of true magic. It is for you to decide'.
'So, are you 100% sure that this was ah igh-tech trick, or do you allow fort he possibility that it was an instance of true magic?'
In the CIPC the procedure was the sameasinthe IC, except that instead of 'magic spell' the words 'physical device' were used.
This was done in order to create an explicit clash between the impossible-magical and the possible-high-tech explanations by making declining the impossible-magical explanation costly.Ifthe participants wanted to satisfy their curiosity and proceed with testing in the action trial, theyhad to acknowledgethat the cause of the effect shown in the demonstration trial wasi nfact true magica nd not ahigh-tech trick.
Hypotheses
If the hypothesis that the I/P effect occursb etween the 'floor and ceiling' of cost of exploratoryb ehaviour werev alid, then in this experiment the expected numbers of participants willingt oe xperiment with the businesscardi nb oth conditions would be largea nd approximately the same.
The second expectation wasthat asignificantly larger number of participants would accept the possibility of the impossible-magical explanation in the IC than in the CIPC.
Indeed, if participants strongly believed that the effect shown in the demonstration trial was at rick and not true magic (CIPC), then theyw ould stick to the non-magical explanation even at the expense of not proceeding to the action trial and having their curiosity remain unsatisfied. Thiswas expected because saying that the effect might be true magicwheniti sobvious that it is not would look like intentional lying, and most participants would not like to produce the impression that theya re lying. However,i f the effect implied even the smallest chance of being caused by true magic(IC), then in this experiment participants should go fort his explanation in order to proceed to the action trial and satisfy their curiosity.
Results
In the pre-test interview,all participants showed aclear appreciation of the difference between tricks and true magic.
In total, 16 participants in the IC (88%) and 15 in the CIPC (100%) said theywanted to proceed and test the effect on the experimenter'sb usiness card. Compared to the results of Expt 3, in this experiment the number of participants willing to proceed to the action trial was significantly larger in both conditions, Fisher'sexact p ¼ : 02 forthe IC and p , : 001 forthe CIPC. There was no significant difference between the numbers of participants who wanted to proceed in the IC and the CIPC in this experiment, Fisher'se xact p ¼ : 48.
In the IC, all participants acknowledgedthat if the magicspell produced the effect, this would be an instance of true magic(consciousness over matter type) and not ahightech trick. In the CIPC,all participants said that if the physical device produced the effect, then this would be atrick and not true magic ('because something caused it to happen, there is atangible reason', 'because it is explainable','it is some kind of electric power and could be scientifically explained, and true magiccannot be scientifically explained').
When proceeding to the actiont rial wasc onditioned by acknowledging that the effect in the demonstration trial may have been acase of true magicand not ahigh-tech trick, 12 participants (67% of the sample) in the IC, but none in the CIPC,acknowledged this possibility.T his difference was significant, Fisher'se xact p , : 001.
Discussion
The results of this experiment supported the expectation that lowering the costo f exploratorybehaviourdown to zero eliminated the I/P effect: 88% of participants in the IC and all participants in the CIPC said that theywanted to proceed to the action trial. These numbersw ere significantly larger than in the same conditions of Expt 3. The obvious explanation of this is that whent here is no risk of losing their valuable objectsdue to their exploratorybehaviour,participants'curiosity becomes adominant motivation of their actions in both conditions. Given that in the imaginarytrial of Expt 3 only afew participants in each condition expressed interest in proceeding to the action trial with their passports being at risk, the results of this experiment supportt he hypothesis that the I/P effect occursonly whenthe costofexploratorybehaviourisnot too high or too low.
The fact that in the IC, but not in the CIPC,al argen umber of participants acknowledgedthat the effect in the demonstration trial might have been caused by true magica nd not by ah igh-tech mechanism supportst he second expectation. It was significantly more difficult fort he participants to acknowledget he impossible-magical explanation in the CIPC than in the IC, even if by not acknowledging this possibility participants had to forfeit their abilitytoproceed to the action trial. Thissuggests that in the IC in Expts 2and 3, participants implicitly believed that there might be an element of the supernatural (i.e., truly magical) in the effect shown in the demonstrationt rial, thoughm ost of them denied that. When, in this experiment, participants were positivelym otivated to accept the likelihood of the impossible-magical explanation, theya ccepted it in the IC, but not in the CIPC.T his difference between conditions cannotb ee xplained by participants'd esire to meett he experimenter's expectations since the instruction was the same in both conditions. One must therefore conclude that in Expts 2and 3, the fact that larger numbers of participants agreed to experiment with their valuable objects in the IC is likely to have resulted from the strong curiosity of participants towardst he effect that seemed impossible, rather than towardsa n interesting but possible high-tech trick.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Expts 1a nd 2s howed that both 4-to 9-year-old children and adults are more likely to engagei ne xploratoryb ehaviour if the target of this behaviour is an impossible event than if it is acounter-intuitive but possible event (the I/P effect). Expt3indicated that the I/P effect remained when the impossible phenomenon was made more irreversible (burning instead of cutting) and the causality vectors were made external in both conditions (a magics pell in the IC and an unknown physical device in the CIPC). This effect cannot be explained as an artefact of participants' mistaking the magical effect forahigh-tech trick. Indeed, in Expt 4most participants explicitly admitted that the effect showninthe IC might have involved true magic,while the effect showninthe CIPC didnot. This suggests that in Expts 2and 3adult participants were more willing to engageinexploratorybehaviour in the IC than in the CIPC because in the IC the target of exploration, apartfrom being novel and counter-intuitive, involved the possibility of the supernatural.
It wasalso found that the I/P effect is exhibited only in the conditions in which the cost of exploratoryb ehaviouri sm oderate (a threat to the safety of the participants' driving licenses).Ifthe cost is too high or too low,participants' exploratorybehaviour decreases or increases to an extent that eliminates the I/P effect.
The question arises of what causes the I/P effect.Indeed, why are children and adults attracted towards phenomena that they( and their social environment) view as impossible? In children, this can be explained by the fact that adults purposefully encourage magical thinking in children by maintaining aspecial 'culture of magic' in the form of traditionalm agical characters( Santa Claus, Tooth Fairy) or using magical explanations of events (Johnson &Harris, 1994; Rosengren &Hickling, 2000; Woolley, 1997) .But why would adults show the I/P effect?
One possible explanation may be that in aworld dominated by science, impossible phenomenafill certain gaps that existinthe mind of the modernindividual. First, they respond to the unsatisfied need to breakaway from the predictableand mundane world that science has created (Subbotsky,1 992; Zusne&Jones, 1982) . In this respect,t he interest shown towards impossible phenomena is kindredt ot he interest that people show towards mass entertainment or paranormal phenomena (Bem &Honorton, 1994; Boyer,1 994; Jahoda, 1969; Tambiah, 1990) .S econd, impossible events like magic providehope that it is possible to gain control over events and feelings that otherwise are beyond our control (Nemeroff&Rozin,2000; Shweder,1977; Zusne&Jones, 1982) .
Another possible explanation is that the I/P effect is am anifestationo facertain degree of belief that most people, unconsciously or consciously, have towards magic. This explanation is based on data showing that people'sunconscious reactions towards food or contamination followthe laws of contagious or sympathetic magic (Nemeroff& Rozin,1992 Rozin, Markwith, &Ross, 1990; Rozin et al.,1986) and,under certain conditions, people consciously acknowledgethe possibility of magic (Subbotsky,2001; Woolley,1997) . Acertain degree of credulity towardsthe possibility of true magicwas also shown in this study.Though small, this degree of credulity was enoughtofacilitate exploratoryb ehaviour in children and adults. Although incompatible with the view of moderns cience, this belief stillh as rational grounds in some areas of everydayl ife (Nemeroff &R ozin, 2000) .
One more way to account forthe I/P effect is to view it as amanifestation of the most archaic and basic structures of the individual'smind. Thisview has its roots in theories that consider magical thinking to be at the origins of the modernm ind (Jaynes, 1976; Tambiah, 1990) . It can also be supported by data showing the increment of magical and paranormal beliefs in people with mentali llnesses (Eckblad &C hapman, 1983; Thalbourne, 1994; Thalbourne &French, 1995) . It will be important in futureresearch to look more closely at magical beliefs of psychiatric patients and to involvesamples of these patients in experimentalstudies such as those described in this paper,rather than in studies based on questionnaires. The results of such studies may shed light on the psychological roots of the I/P effect, as well as provide clinicians with ab etter understanding of the cognitive changes that accompany certain kinds of mental illnesses.
The I/P effect provides supportfor the theory that presentsthe development of the individual mind as adiversification and coexistence of various, even alternative, modes of making sense of reality (Boyer,1 994; Nemeroff&Rozin,2 000; Shweder,1 977; Subbotsky,1 992; Tambiah, 1990) . Thise ffect can also partially explaint he popularity that fantastic charactersw ith magical powerse njoy in the domains of entertainment, education, and commercial advertising.
